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INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) celebrates its
twentieth anniversary in 2015 and has proved very successful in
strengthening the contours of the international economic order and
promoting reforms in a number of member countries.1 One can find
abundant literature on amendments made by different countries and
sectors related to the law, the organization, or the Dispute Settlement
Body (“DSB”) decisions. 2 Indeed, almost all of the 460-plus trade
disputes 3 that have arisen since 1995 have been resolved in
accordance with WTO law. 4 Unsurprisingly, Bruce Wilson, former
1 . The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was established on January 1, 1995,
replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), under the terms of the
Marrakesh Agreement. This international organization serves as a common institutional
framework for trade among its 160 Member States, and as provided for under this agreement.
See Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Aug. 2014). Its work consists of facilitating “the implementation, administration and
operation, and furthering the objectives” of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (concerning several fields of international trade,
such as goods, services, and intellectual property rights).
2. For instance, in 1994 the United States passed the Uruguay Round Agreement Act,
which implemented several changes to domestic patent law required by the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement”). See Adam Isaac
Hasson, Domestic Implementation of International Obligations: The Quest for World Patent
Law Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 373, 374 (2002). After the US claim, the
WTO ordered Europe to amend its banana import rules. See Joel P. Trachtman, Bananas,
Direct Effect and Compliance, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 667 (1999) [hereinafter Trachtman].
The TRIPs Agreement compelled India to amend its patent regime in a substantial manner
since 1999. See K. D. Raju, WTO–TRIPS Obligations and Patent Amendments in India: A
Critical Stocktaking, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 226, 227 (2004). South Africa’s anti-dumping
law and practice incorporate WTO tenets. See Lonias Ndlovu, An Assessment of the WTO
Compliance of the Recent Regulatory Regime of South Africa’s Dumping and Anti-Dumping
Law, 5 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 29, 30 (2010).
3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
4 . See generally Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s
Supremacy in the International Trade Order – A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013). In fact, the WTO is so
successful that WTO interpretations are being increasingly imported into investment
arbitrations. This trend has generated some doubts because investment and trade regulation are
not part of the same system, and the birth, growth, and evolution of the concepts may be
substantially different. Jürgen Kurtz supported the view that arbitral tribunals, through their
multiple misunderstandings of the WTO acquis, have actually produced greater incoherence
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Director of the WTO Legal Affairs Division, observed that in almost
all cases a Member found to be in violation of its WTO obligations
would later comply with WTO law. 5 After all, Professor Louis
Henkin rightly observed that “almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time.”6
However, the key issue of compliance with WTO law is
always approached in a vertical manner. The law of the WTO is
superior to domestic legal systems, and Members comply with
international trade law because they have expressed their willingness
to be bound. Much of the reflection has addressed the nature, i.e., the
binding character of WTO law. A wealth of analyses has focused on
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”).7 Indeed, the DSU is
one of the central achievements of the Uruguay Round negotiations.8
This Article deconstructs the WTO obligation of conformity
enshrined in Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, demonstrating
that this key provision is not a mere interface between international
and domestic law. In fact, the obligation of conformity is the source
of a process of compliance which, although more modest than usual
law of international responsibility, has proven to be effective in
securing final compliance. Deconstructing the obligation of
conformity helps to explain and demystify the high level of
and inconsistency in the case of the National Treatment standard. See Jürgen Kurtz, The Use
and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor–State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents, 20
EUR. J. INT’L L. 749, 750 (2009).
5. Wilson indicated that in the same article that in ninety percent of the adopted reports,
one or more violations of the WTO obligations have been found by panels and/or the Appellate
Body. See Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute
Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 398 (2007); see also
WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/databases/implementaverage.php (last
visited Oct. 24, 2014) (providing very useful statistics, in particular the average
implementation time period).
6. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979); see also, Abram Chayes &
Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 177 (1993).
7. See, e.g., PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & THOMAS COTTIER, THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO 1-2 (Petros
C. Mavroidis & Thomas Cottier eds., 2003); David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO
Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 399 (1998); YANG GUOHUA, BRYAN
MERCURIO & LI YONGJIE, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED
INTERPRETATION (2005); see also Dan Sarooshi, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the World
Trade Organization: What Role for Systemic Values in the Resolution of International
Economic Disputes?, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 445, 446 (2014).
8. See Dispute Settlement Body, Overview of the State of Play of WTO Disputes: Annual
Report (2013), WT/DSB/61/Add.1 (Nov. 1, 2013).
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compliance with WTO law while significantly contributing to the
understanding of why and how States comply with international law.
This Article contributes to the understanding of why States
comply with international law, specifically WTO law. It focuses on a
key provision of the WTO agreement, Article XVI:4, which plays a
key role—and crystalizes other processes—in inducing compliance.
This provision reads “Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations
as provided in the annexed Agreements.”
The significance of this provision was underscored by John H.
Jackson9 and is often cited but rarely commented upon—something
this Article intends to remedy. 10 The obligation enshrined in this
provision is not the mere driving force of States compliance with
international trade law. WTO compliance—through the general
obligation of conformity—is a complex process. Professor Harold
Koh offered a general theory of why States comply with international
law by showing that transnational actors obey international law as a
result of repeated interaction with other actors in the transnational
legal process.11 In deconstructing the WTO obligation of conformity,
this Article unveils the complex and dynamic process of compliance.

9. Insofar as it can serve as a basis for the notion that the purpose of the Dispute
Settlement (“DS”) procedure is to establish an international law obligation for the Member
States to comply with the results of the interpretations and applications made in the DS
process. John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:
Obligation to Comply or Option to "Buy Out"?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 112 (2004). For a
fascinating debate which preceded Jackson’s article, see Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO
Dispute Understanding Mechanism: Less is More, 90 AM J. INT’L L. 416 (1996); see also John
H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of
Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 60–64 (1997); Warren Schwartz & Alan Sykes, The
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade
Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (2002).
10. See, e.g., Jackson, WTO Dispute Settlement Reports, supra note 9, at 112; Rafael
Leal-Arcas, Choice of Jurisdiction in International Trade Disputes: Going Regional or
Global?, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 n. 2 (2007); Sarooshi, supra note 7, at 459 n. 65; Laura
Spitz, The Gift of Enron: An Opportunity to Talk About Capitalism, Equality, Globalization,
and the Promise of a North-American Charter of Fundamental Rights, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 315,
379 n. 262 (2005); James D. Wilets, A Unified Theory of International Law, the State, and the
Individual: Transnational Legal Harmonization in the Context of Economic and Legal
Globalization, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 753, 806 n. 149 (2010); Elena A. Wilson, Russia in the
WTO: Will It Give Full Direct Effect to WTO Law?, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. &
DEV. L. J. 325, 326 (2014).
11. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2656 (1997).
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Part I outlines in what fashion conformity is a fundamental
obligation of the multilateral trading system, which is two-fold in
nature and places emphasis on the high degree of similarity between
national and international law. Part II then discusses how its place in
the normative corpus makes it a principle of higher importance, which
not only precludes the invocation of domestic laws (VC 27) but
further requires a positive act. When put into practice, the WTO
obligation confirms its importance in light of its wide scope of
application. However, although all norms of domestic law are subject
to compliance, the ways and means employed by Members remain
out of the scope of the obligation. Equally important to understand the
impact of the obligation is its necessary combination with another
provision. Part III examines that, although demanding in its reach
while flexible in the way it is respected, the conformity obligation
may engender to litigation. Part IV argues that compliance is not left
to the appreciation of each Member but attributed to the DSB which
plays a key role—direct and indirect—in the compliance process.12
During this stage the shape and substance of the obligation are
modified, giving birth to a secondary obligation to comply. More
precise and subject to a deadline, and sometimes incorporating some
intrusive guidance, the new secondary obligation gives a new
opportunity to comply. The DSB is in fact a restatement of the initial
obligation of compliance without imposing a sanction which would
cover the period during which an internal rule existed in opposition to
WTO law. Part V explains that the obligation, derived as formulated
by the DSB, does not extinguish the obligation of Article XVI:4 of
the WTO Agreement but reformulates it in a different way, giving it a
precise nature. The binding character of the secondary obligation is
complemented by a mechanism of counter-measure which largely
contributes to securing full compliance.
I. SEQUENCING THE WTO OBLIGATION TO COMPLY
This Part provides a sequencing of the conformity obligation
structure with the aim of identifying the source of conformity in the
12 . The creation of an obligatory Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”), whose
rulings are binding within the WTO framework, has modified the entire international
economic structure. The DSB makes the WTO “an integration organization, rooted in
contemporary international law. In simple terms, the WTO’s sophisticated dispute settlement
mechanism makes it a distinctive organization.” Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and Its
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969, 970 (2006).
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WTO system and offering a general definition of conformity. Section
A shows that the conformity is a quest for similarity across national
and international legal orders. In this respect, the conformity principle
is better described as a centripetal force which creates a movement
and assumes a dynamic role in the compliance process. Section B
critically analyzes the conformity requirements that allows one to
identify two complementary obligations which form the WTO law of
compliance.
A. Quest of Similarity: Transforming National Law
All WTO Members are bound by the obligation to adapt their
domestic law to WTO law. 13 This obligation expresses Members’
willingness to ensure that international trade law is enforced
effectively on behalf of those who have undertaken to implement it.
Also, the obligation to conform is justified only insofar as its primary
object is to avoid any risk of conflict between two legal systems, i.e.,
the WTO system and Members’ domestic systems, as well as serious
disputes among various Members of the organization. The WTO
Agreement makes it clear that, from the perspective of the WTO, its
legal system prevails over domestic law. Article XVI:4 requires
unequivocally that each Member shall ensure the conformity of its
laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with its obligations
under the WTO agreements. However, Article XVI:4 of the WTO
Agreement requires “conformity” without defining it, probably
because conventional wisdom is sufficient to grasp the essence of the
word. This, however, raises an issue of interpretation.
In its plain meaning, “conformity” refers to the “compliance
with standards, rules, or laws” and requires “similarity in form or
type.”14 The compliance is “the action or fact of complying with a
13. The “WTO law” is made of a number of agreements. Annex 1, the most extensive,
consists of GATT 1994 and its 12 side agreements (Annex 1A); the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (“GATS”), its instruments, and the Members’ schedules (Annex 1B); and
the TRIPs Agreement (Annex 1C). Further annexes comprise the DSU (Annex 2), the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3) and the plurilateral agreements (Annex 4). See Julien
Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules Through Negotiations and
Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, 21 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 153 (2007).
14 . OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 366 (3d ed. 2012). The origin of the word
“conformity” is to be found in the late Middle English transposing Old French “conformité”
and late Latin “conformitas,” both originating from the Latin verb “conformare” which means
“to form, fashion.” Id.
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wish or command” and “the state or fact of according with or meeting
rules or standards15.” Meanwhile the similarity is the state or fact of
being similar, i.e., of “having a resemblance in appearance, character,
or quantity, without being identical.”16 Since the conformity does not
require identity, it means that domestic laws do not have to be
identical, i.e., “similar in every detail; exactly alike” as the WTO
norms.
When the Appellate Body was called upon to interpret the
conformity principle, it also relied on the ordinary meaning stressing
the demanding nature of the obligation. The Appellate Body stated
that “much more is required before one thing may be regarded as
‘conform[ing] to’ another: the former must ‘comply with,’ ‘yield or
show compliance’ with the latter. The reference of ‘conform to’ is to
‘correspondence in form of manner,’ to ‘compliance with’ or
‘acquiescence,’ to ‘follow[ing] in form of nature.’”17
This first attempt to define the ordinary meaning of conformity
helps to interpret the WTO concept of conformity and also to identify
the key practical elements of conformity. First, conformity requires an
action by the Member States who must comply with the law of the
WTO. Second, compliance requires reaching similarity, which is a
requirement for domestic laws to resemble in appearance, contents,
and character to international law. Conformity is a demanding
requirement which, however, does not extend to a requirement of
formal identity. Third, from a normative perspective, WTO
compliance is a process whose goal is to bring national laws to a
certain threshold of resemblance with WTO law. In the compliance
process, the WTO conformity obligation acts as a centripetal force
which “is that by which bodies are drawn or impelled, or in any way
tend, towards a point as to a centre.” 18 Fourth, using the physics
metaphor again, Member States are like satellites in orbit around the
WTO; the centripetal force is supplied by the conformity requirement
which acts like gravity. The requirement of similarity with WTO law
15. “COMPLIANCE” in OXFORD DICTIONARIES OF U.S. ENGLISH http://
www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english.
http://
16 . “SIMILAR” IN OXFORD DICTIONARIES OF U.S. ENGLISH
www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english (emphasis added).
17. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), ¶ 163, WT/DS26AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); 1 THE NEW SHORTER
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 477 (6th ed. 2007).
18. ISAAC NEWTON, THE PRINCIPIA: MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
PHILOSOPHY 10 (2010).

64

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:57

also results in the logical deduction that gradually all 161 WTO
Members should have similar national laws on trade measures. 19
At a more conceptual and general level, conformity, as defined
by the WTO system, is an obligatory process in which each Member
State has to transform its internal law in accordance with the rules
contained in the various WTO agreements. 20 In such a process,
aiming at conformity is obligatory. In a nutshell, by ratifying the
WTO agreements, each and all Member States agree to limit their
autonomy and to exercise their normative power only in a particular
direction.
B. Duplication: Primary and Secondary Obligation to Comply
Since the principle expressed by Article XVI:4 is included in
the Agreement Establishing the WTO, which forms the very basis of
the organization, the conformity obligation applies to all other WTO
agreements even if those agreements do not refer to it specifically.21
In addition, under Article XVI:3, if there is “a conflict between a
provision of this Agreement and a provision of any of the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to
the extent of the conflict.”22 As a result, one can deduce that Article
19. As concluded by Wang:
in the end, for the purpose of complying with the WTO requirements, the
approach, policy and style of legislation of Members will gradually become
unified and have common or similar features. The WTO’s impact on the
substantive provisions of laws and regulations of its Members was intended by
the fathers of the WTO. Its effect on other aspects of legislation may not have
been foreseen.
GUIGUO WANG, RADIATING IMPACT OF WTO ON ITS MEMBERS’ LEGAL SYSTEM: THE
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 349, 352 (2010).
20. Internal law encompasses all the normative acts that produce a legal effect, including
judiciary decisions. Indeed, a WTO Member “bears responsibility for acts of all its
departments of government, including its judiciary.” Without doubt, “the judiciary is a state
organ and even if an act or omission derives from a WTO Member's judiciary, it is
nevertheless still attributable to that WTO Member.” See Appellate Body Report, United
States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Japan, ¶ 182, WT/DS322/AB/RW (Aug. 8, 2009).
21. The Appellate Body states that “Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement provides that
‘[e]ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements’, which include the
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement.” Appellate Body Report, United States –
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 301, WT/DS217/AB/R,
WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
22. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
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XVI:4 is a rule of higher rank than the provisions of the agreements
listed in the Annexes.
Also, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 is a general clause which
is reaffirmed by other provisions contained in specific agreements
whose observance calls for the adaptation of domestic law. For
instance, Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires each
Member to “take all necessary steps, of a general or particular
character, to ensure, no later than the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreements for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.”23 Even if some terms of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
(“ADA”) Article 18.4 differ from those of Article XVI:4, they are
identical as far as the basic obligation of ensuring the conformity of a
Member’s laws, regulations, and administrative procedures—found in
both Articles—is concerned. Such identity is validated by the
Appellate Body (“AB”), which basically, gives the same meaning to
the specific provisions which simply reiterates the general clause of
Article XVI:4. 24
Finally, if a provision of an “annexed Agreement” is breached, a
violation of Article XVI:4 immediately occurs. 25 As a result, the
inclusion of the conformity requirement in the WTO agreement, the
supreme rank of this agreement in the WTO normative corpus, and
the fact that any violation of WTO rules immediately results into a
23. See Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Annex 1A art. 8(2)(a), reprinted in
1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 261, 269 (Joseph F. Dennin
ed., 1995) (“Each Member shall ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with
the provisions of this Agreement.”). See also Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (Apr. 12,
1979), GATT B.I.S.D (26th Supp.) at 188 (1979) (“Each government accepting or acceding to
this Agreement shall ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of this Agreement for it,
the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of
this Agreement.”).
24. “With respect to Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, we note
that, if some of the terms of Article XVI:4 differ from those of Article 18.4, they are identical
and unqualified as far as the basic obligation of ensuring the conformity of laws, regulations
and administrative procedures found in both articles is concerned.” Panel Report, United States
– Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 – Complaint by Japan, ¶ 6.287, WT/DS162/R (May 29, 2000).
25. In this respect, it was logically deduced that “[A]n additional finding on whether the
same measure is also in breach of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement would not be
necessary in order to resolve the dispute between the parties. It was already noted that a Panel
does not need to examine all legal claims made by a complaining party, but just those ‘which
must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.’” Panel Report, Chile Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina, ¶ 17.170, WT/DS207/RW (Dec. 8, 2006).

66

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:57

violation of Article XVI:4, make the conformity requirement a
primary obligation, i.e., an obligation which is at the core of the WTO
legal system.
If a Member does not comply with WTO rules, this may give
rise to a dispute. A dispute arises when a Member State believes that
another Member State is violating an agreement or a commitment that
it has made to the WTO.26 A violation complaint will succeed when
the respondent fails to carry out its obligations under the WTO
agreements resulting, directly or indirectly, in nullification or
impairment of a benefit accruing to the complainant under these
agreements. If such an argument can be established before a Panel
and the AB, it means that these two conditions are satisfied, and thus
the defendant will have to change its legislation. 27 The Dispute
Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”) then appears as the second element
to ensure the conformity of domestic law with the WTO prescriptions.
When the DSB adopts a decision to end a dispute, the primary
obligation contained in the WTO agreement is redefined and
transformed into a secondary obligation to comply. The secondary
obligation to comply is conceptually distinct from the primary
obligation to comply. They both have the same aim; however, they
differ in the form, content, and enforcement.
This Section has provided a preliminary deconstruction of the
obligation to comply. It has demonstrated that, firstly, the WTO
system is exerting an influence on domestic systems, which have to
26. See, e.g., Julien Chaisse, The WTO Seals Products Dispute - Traditional Hunting,
Public Morals and Technical Barriers to Trade, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 79, 8082 (2011).
27. In practice, the first of these two conditions, viz., violation, plays a much more
important role than the second condition, viz., nullification or impairment of a benefit, does—
this is because nullification or impairment is “presumed” to exist whenever a violation has
been established. Members may also initiate “non-violation complaints,” relying on “nonviolation nullification or impairment and unavailability of benefits based on reasonable
expectations.” This argument might apply, for example, where a Member’s laws and
regulations conform to a WTO obligation, yet the Member systematically refuses to apply
those laws and regulations, thereby nullifying or impairing a benefit expected to accrue
(whether directly or indirectly) under WTO law. See Frieder Roessler, The Concept of
Nullification and Impairment in the Legal System of the World Trade Organization, in 11
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, STUDIES
IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 125, 141-42 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997). See
generally Thomas Cottier & Schefer Krista Nadakavukaren, Non-Violation Complaints in
WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future, in 11 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM, STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 145–183 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997).
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transform in order to reach some degree of similarity—with the WTO
and, consequently, across them. Secondly, the influence is due to a
centripetal force which is formed by the general obligation of
conformity—primary conformity obligation—complemented by the
rulings of the DSB—secondary conformity obligation. Subsequent
developments will focus on each aspect of the primary and secondary
obligation to comply in order to fully deconstruct the contribution of
the conformity obligation with the WTO compliance process.
II. COMPARING WTO CONFORMITY TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE
As prescribed by customary international law and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), States are obliged to
perform the treaty obligations. 28 This fundamental principle is the
cornerstone of classic international law.29 It means that the parties are
bound by the contract that they have concluded and they cannot,
therefore, shirk the obligations that they have thereby accepted. This
is an indication of the predominance of willingness and, more
importantly, of consent as the material source of law and,
consequently, where formal sources are concerned, the predominance
of treaties over national laws. Section A explains that in WTO law,
compliance obligation fully incorporates the classic rule of pacta sunt
servanda. Section B, however, points out that the WTO conformity
obligation also imposes a positive obligation to comply, i.e., to enact
the law.
A. Congruence of Obligations’ Scopes
As a basic principle of civil law and public international law,
pacta sunt servanda must be based on good faith as underscored by
28. In public international law, the implementation of treaties is an obligation under
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which insists on the execution of
a treaty in good faith and in compliance with the classic rule pacta sunt servanda (i.e.,
“agreements must be kept”). See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”)
29. This is generally understood as a moral obligation to keep a promise, rather than just
a legal obligation. “According to this interpretation of the pacta maxim, then, the role of the
law is to provide a state sanction for moral norms. This point, so obvious to civil lawyers, is
much less so to anyone trained in the Holmesian tradition.” Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt
Servanda: A Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 406 (1994); see DAVID J. BEDERMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 15 (3d ed. 2010).
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the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the 1974 Nuclear Tests
judgment. 30 Earlier, in 1932, the Permanent Court of International
Justice (“PCIJ”) logically considered that domestic legislation could
not be invoked to justify the non-enforcement of an international
obligation.31 In this regard, the State Constitution, the supreme norm
in a domestic legal order, cannot be invoked in such a case, either, as
stated in another PCIJ judgment.32
According to Article 26 of the VCLT, “every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith,” or else States can be found to be in violation of the treaty.33
Tracking the obligation of good faith performance is a general rule of
treaty interpretation, which implies that treaties must be construed in
good faith, and their interpretations must take into account “any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.” 34 Under international law, a State is obliged not to
frustrate or undermine the object and purpose of a treaty when it is a
signatory. The PCIJ’s jurisprudence has, to some extent, completed
this general obligation stipulated in Article 27 of the VCLT, that is, “a
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty.”35
The WTO follows interpretations of public international law
as explained by the arbitrators in the 2003 Canada – Export Credits
dispute:
Pursuant to the general principle of international law pacta sunt
servanda, as embodied in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (1969), States are not only presumed to
perform their treaty obligations in good faith, they are expected
30 . “One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal
obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are
inherent in international co-operation, in particular in an age when this Co-operation in many
fields is becoming increasingly essential.” Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgement, 1974 I.C.J
268, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20).
31. See Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Judgment, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 46 (June 7).
32. See Access to‚ or Anchorage in‚ the port of Danzig‚ of Polish War Vessels, Advisory
Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J (ser. A/B) No. 43 (Dec. 11).
33. Vienna Convention, supra note 28.
34. Id. at art. 31(3)(c). In determining the purpose and context of the treaty, suitable
recourse may be made to the preamble and annexes of the treaty. Id. at art. 31(2).
35 . To ensure consistency in State behavior, the Permanent Court of International
Justice, in a number of cases, affirmed the principle that a “State cannot invoke its municipal
law as a reason for failure to fulfill its international obligation.” See I.C. MacGibbon, Estoppel
in International Law, 7 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 468, 473 (1958).
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and obliged to do so. We also note that Article 27 of the same
Vienna Convention specifies that obligations under internal law
cannot excuse States from complying with their international
obligations.36

And this interpretation also stands in 1998’s Anti-Dumping
Investigation Regarding Portland Cement case in which the Panel
concluded that “the argument that Guatemala could not have initiated
the investigation until after it had notified Mexico, pursuant to
provisions of its own Constitution and law, does not affect our
conclusion in this regard.”37
Pacta sunt servanda is, however, not an absolute, rigid and
formalistic principle under which States must in any and all
circumstances strictly obey to the letter promises that they have made
under the WTO agreements no matter what the content of those
promises, no matter how severely circumstances have changed, or no
matter what dire effects obeisance might have on the State’s
operations or existence. 38 States may on some occasions escape
liability for breaching their promises if their defenses are determined
to be applicable as a matter of law, such as the defenses of necessity,
which has been at the center of a number of recent investment

36. Decision by the Arbitrators, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for
Regional Aircraft, ¶ 3.104, WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Canada – Export
Credit and Loan Guarantees].
37. Furthermore, “[i]n acceding to the WTO, Guatemala undertook to be bound by
Article 5.5 when initiating anti-dumping investigations. Any failure to respect Article 5.5 may
not be justified on the basis of inconsistent provisions of domestic law. Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement explicitly states that each Member shall ensure the conformity of its law,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements.” See Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, § 7.38, WT/DS60/R (June 19, 1998).
38. As explained by Jennings:
“[i]t is wrong to suppose that pacta sunt servanda must apply tout court in all
cases or in none. No mature law of contract is absolute, and few principles of
law are to be understood without qualification. . . . Is it not likely that the true
position is that the principle functions, as it does in the case of treaties, as a
presumption: a presumption leaning against the existence of any right of
unilateral termination; but which, like all presumptions, may in some cases be
successfully rebutted? Thus understood it may be found both to fit readily into
the pattern of existing law and to explain it.”
R.Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 156, 177
(1961).
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arbitrations, force majeure,39 ultra vires,40 and fundamental change of
circumstances.
In WTO law, exceptions take the form of waivers or general
exceptions. Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement therefore provides
that the Ministerial Conference may decide in exceptional
circumstances to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by WTO
law. Such a decision is to be taken formally by casting a vote of three
fourths of the Members. Consensus is required for waivers in respect
of any obligation subject to a transition period or a period for staged
implementation. 41 In practice, all decisions are prepared and taken by
consensus in the General Council. Article IX:3 of the WTO
Agreement extends Article XXV:5 of the GATT 1947 and makes it
clear that waivers may be adopted with regard to any obligation and
agreement under the WTO legal framework. Waivers are of practical
importance. 42 They have been requested by Members several times
and were subsequently granted by the Contracting Parties under the
GATT 1947 and now by the Ministerial Conference under the
WTO.43
39. State necessity is the force majeure of international law. It permits the contravention
of state obligations when absolutely necessary. In those cases, the exceptional circumstances
preclude the wrongfulness of the act. Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Addendum to
the 8th Report on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 14, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/318/Add. 5-7 [hereinafter Addendum to the 8th Report on State Responsibility]
(Force majeure describes the situation “where an unforeseen and unavoidable external
circumstance, an irresistible ‘force’ beyond the control of the subject taking the action, makes
it materially impossible for that subject to act in conformity with an international obligation”).
40. Because of a lack of competent institutions that can deal with such ultra vires acts,
international law relies on such doctrines as protest and non-recognition. IAN BROWNLIE,
SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, PART I 26-27 (1983); see
Theodor Meron, State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 372, 375-76 (1989). For a Japanese civil law scholar's view that ultra vires does not
apply to States because a State can be liable internationally even for those acts which it
undertakes in violation of its own laws, see Mizushima Tomonori, The Individual as
Beneficiary of State Immunity: Problems of the Attribution of Ultra Vires Conduct, 29 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 261, 277-78 (2001).
41. WTO Agreement supra note 1, at art. IX(3) (“In exceptional circumstances, the
Ministerial Conference may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this
Agreement or any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. . . .”). For an interesting contribution
to analyzing the potential of the WTO waiver as a legal instrument to reconcile conflicting
norms and interests, see Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO
for Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 615, 645
(2009).
42. See D. Marinberg, GATT/WTO Waivers: “Exceptional Circumstances” as Applied to
the Lomé Waiver, 19 B. U. INT’L L. J. 129 (2001).
43 . One of the most important waivers ever was the one granted to the European
Commission (“EC”) in relation to the preferential treatment for bananas originating in the
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WTO conformity may also not apply if an exception is
applicable. The WTO system regulates a number of specific or
general exceptions. 44 In addition to the exceptions of the general
prohibition of quantitative restrictions set out in GATT Article XI:2,45
one can identify specific exceptions in the TRIPs agreement,46 such as
the doctrine of fair use exceptions. 47 Article 3 of the TRIPs
Agreement allows for existing exceptions provided for in other
relevant intellectual property conventions.48 Articles XVI and XVII of
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (“ACP”) countries pursuant to the Fourth
Lomé Convention. It became necessary to waive the most-favored-nation (“MFN”) obligation
under Article I:1 of the GATT, as the agreement did not comply with the requirements of
Article XXIV of the GATT, but was indispensable to avoid disruption of production in and
exports from ACP countries. Subsequently, the question arose, and was eventually brought
before a panel and the Appellate Body, whether the EC regime was covered by the waiver with
regard to preferential treatment of ACP bananas. The report of the Appellate Body indicates
how carefully the text of a waiver is analyzed and assessed. See Appellate Body Report, EC –
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R 509 (Sept. 9,
1997).
44. For a commentary on the regime of Article XX of the GATT, see Julien Chaisse,
Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections –
General Exceptions Clause as a Forced Perspective, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 332 (2013). For
more specific aspects of the WTO exceptions, see also BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M.
KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 441 (2001)
(discussing GATT Article XX’s application to human rights and labor standards); Glenn
Weiser, The Clean Development Mechanism Versus the World Trade Organization: Can FreeMarket Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement Survive Free Trade?, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 531, 553-55, 583-85 (1999) (discussing the WTO Dispute Settlement Body's tendencies
to interpret Article XX narrowly and to respond negatively towards unilateral trade measures
adopted to protect the global commons).
45. Article XI:2 of the GATT 1994 gained some importance with regard to agricultural
products as it excludes them, under certain conditions, from the general prohibition of
quantitative restrictions (“QRs”). Under the GATT 1947, various panels were called upon to
interpret Article XI:2(c). Under the WTO, with the conclusion of the Agreement on
Agriculture, this paragraph has lost its relevance.
46 . On the role of the TRIPs Agreement, see generally Julien Chaisse & Puneeth
Nagaraj, Changing Lanes – Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property Rights, 36 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 223 (2014).
47. The TRIPs Agreement recognises the doctrine of fair use exceptions in Article 17
(copyright) and Article 30 (patents). These provisions allow governments to make limited
exceptions for public policy reasons. These provisions have not yet been fully explored and
refined in jurisprudence. See Panel Report, US – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), in which a panel had to deal with two US copyright provisions
exempting certain transmissions from copyright infringement. The panel focused mainly on
Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement in deciding whether these exceptions were permissible.
When interpreting Article 13, the panel failed to make explicit reference to the objectives and
purposes of the TRIPs Agreement as embodied in Articles 7 and 8.
48. See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 349-50
(1995) (discussing authorization for Members to unilaterally offer “more extensive protection

72

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:57

the GATS 49 allow for far-reaching individualized exemptions and
qualifications set out in the Members’ specific schedules. 50 Further
GATT51 exceptions are contained in Article XII (balance-of-payments
safeguard measures),52 Article XX (general exceptions),53 and Article
XXI (national security exceptions) 54 of the GATT 1994. These
exceptions are frequently utilized to pursue other legitimate policy
goals. WTO conformity is congruent to pacta sunt servanda rules. If
there is no valid exception—in the form of a waiver or Article XX—
Members are obliged to perform treaty obligations.
B. WTO Additional Requirements
Whereas WTO jurisprudence did not clarify the exact sense of
Article XVI:4, the European Union stated in the Sections 301–310 of
the Trade Act of 1974 case that “Article XVI:4 must be interpreted to
impose requirements with respect to domestic law additional to the
requirements that arise already from the substantive WTO obligations
than is required by this Agreement” for intellectual property rights, so long as, in doing so,
other TRIPs Agreement provisions are not contravened, and the “national treatment”
provisions of the main international conventions are honored); see also Joost Pauwelyn, The
Dog that Barked but Didn't Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J.
INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 389, 392 (2010).
49. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, at General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex
1B on Financial Services.
50. On GATS exceptions, see Wei Wang, On the Relationship Between Market Access
and National Treatment Under the GATS, 46 INT'L LAW. 1045, 1053 (2012).
51. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187.
52. GATT Article XII permits a WTO Member to increase a bound tariff in order to
address a shortfall in its balance-of-payments position. Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the
IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM.
J. INT’L. L. 561, 571 (2002) .
53. In the practice of WTO law, Article XX of the GATT 1994 is one of the most
important provisions. It justifies deviations from other rules, in particular, but not exclusively,
from the principle of national treatment and from the prohibition of quantitative restrictions.
See MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 787 (2d ed. 2006); see
also Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J.
WORLD TRADE 37, 45 (1991).
54. See Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant
Failure?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2003) (“This exception confers a potentially broad grant
of authority, because the GATT does not define critical terms such as ‘considers necessary,’
‘essential security interests,’ ‘time of war,’ and ‘emergency in international relations.’
Consequently, the scope of the ‘war’ and ‘emergency’ exception in Article XXI is not readily
discernible. Similarly, the fact that a WTO Member may take any action to protect ‘essential’
interests that ‘it considers necessary’ leaves open the question of whether the use of Article
XXI is subject to review by a WTO panel.”).
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themselves. This is achieved if Article XVI:4 is interpreted to
stipulate a ‘correspondence, likeness or agreement’ between domestic
law and the relevant WTO obligations.”55 In that case the European
Union was opposed to the United States, which defended a more
restrictive approach of Article XVI:4 and considered that this Article
did nothing but confirm the traditional sense of the rule pacta sunt
servanda.56 According to the European Union,57 “the terms ‘ensure’
and ‘conformity,’ taken together in their context, therefore indicate
that Article XVI:4 obliges Members not merely to give their
executive authorities formally the right to act consistently with WTO
law, but to structure their law in a manner that ‘makes certain’ that the
objectives of the covered agreements will be achieved.”58 Making use
of the interpretation principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat , i.e.,
the principle of effectiveness, 59 the Panel finally chose the
interpretation 60 of Article XVI:4 provided by the European Union
55. Panel Report, United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 4.370,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].
56. One can observe here a difference in the understanding of the principle’s meaning,
probably caused by the fact that pacta sunt servanda comes from civil law. The role of the
principle in common law is much more limited. See A. Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A
Mediation, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 433 (1994).
57. Before the Treaty of Lisbon took effect on December 1, 2009, the European Union
did not have the legal capacity to enter into international agreements. See Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 216-218, 2008 O.J. C
115/1, for amendments that gave the EU the legal ability to forge international treaties. As of
December 1, 2009, the WTO officially began using the term “European Union” to refer to
what had previously been called the European Communities. In order to facilitate the reading
of this article, the author uses the term “European Union” throughout, even when disputes
occurred prior to the WTO’s adoption of the term in 2009. The WTO official website which
reminds that “Before that, ‘European Communities’ was the official name in WTO business
for legal reasons, and that name continues to appear in older material.” See The European
Union
and The
WTO,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/
european_communities_e.htm.
58. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 4.371.
59. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat literally translates to: “that the matter may have
effect rather than fail.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1762–1763 (8th ed. 2004). This principle
implies that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An
interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility. For an application by the Appellate Body
(“AB”), see Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 26, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
60. In its broadest sense, the principle ut res magis results in “favoring the interpretation
that would most effectively fulfill the object and purpose of a provision or a treaty.” In this
light, the principle ut res magis “serves as an adjunct to the teleological approach to treaty
interpretation.” N. Jansen Calamita, Sanctions, Countermeasures, and the Iranian Nuclear
Issue, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1393, 1414 n.78 (2009).
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since the Panel considered that “Article XVI:4, in contrast, not only
precludes pleading conflicting internal law as a justification for WTO
inconsistencies, but requires WTO Members actually to ensure the
conformity of internal law with its WTO obligations.”61 This means
that in the WTO legal system, Article XVI:4 is not only a
fundamental and additional principle to govern the relations between
Members’ domestic laws, regulations, administrative procedures, and
WTO law, but it also applies over and above the obligation under
general public international law enshrined in Articles 26 and 27 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
The legal consequences of the consistency between internal
legal systems and WTO law are significant. Indeed, Article 27 of the
VCLT prohibits Members from taking advantage of an internal
provision to escape their international obligations but it does not hold
that an internal provision contrary to international law constitutes a
violation ipso facto. There may, however, be a violation when a
domestic norm, even non-applied, contradicts WTO law. This is
precisely the case with the WTO system. It is not new because this
approach was followed at the time of the GATT 1947. In GATT
jurisprudence, legislation providing for tax discrimination against
imported products was, for instance, found to violate the GATT, and
this was the case even before it had actually been applied to specific
products, i.e., before any given product had actually been
discriminated against. 62 As a result, “GATT acquis, confirmed
in Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and recent WTO panel
reports, make it abundantly clear that legislation as such,
independently from its application in specific cases, may breach
GATT/WTO obligations.”63 Article XVI:4 imposes upon Members an
obligation to take positive measures in adapting their normative
61. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.41 n.652.
62. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, ¶ 5.2.2, L/6175 (June 5, 1987) (where the legislation imposing the tax
discrimination only had to be applied by the tax authorities at the end of the year after the
panel examined the matter); Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages, ¶¶ 5.39, 5.57, 5.60, 5.66, WT/DS23/R (Mar. 16, 1992) (where the legislation
imposing the discrimination was, for example, not being enforced by the authorities). But see,
e.g., Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
¶ 84, WT/DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990); Panel Report, EU – Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components, ¶¶ 5.25-5.26, L/6657 (Mar. 22, 1990); Panel Report, United States – Measures
Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco, ¶ 118, WT/DS44/R (Aug. 12,
1994).
63. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.41.
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system upon the entry into force of the WTO agreements. Even before
generating a material contradiction between the application of an
internal rule and a WTO law, the simple absence of conformity
constitutes a manifest breach of the engagement contained in Article
XVI:4. The Panel set up for the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 case thus
observed that “a Member’s anti-dumping legislation must be
compatible with the WTO Agreement continuously, whether that
legislation is applied or not.” 64 A given law, independently of its
application in a precise case—and comparatively without any actual
damage—can be incompatible with the WTO law as reaffirmed in
WTO jurisprudence.65 About this, a Panel explains that it is because
“Article XVI:4, though not expanding the material obligations under
WTO agreements, expands the type of measures made subject to
these obligations.”66
In other words, by making the three types of measures, i.e.,
Members’ laws, regulations, and administrative procedures, fully
subject to their obligations imposed in the WTO Agreements, Article
XVI:4 can thus be applied to the greatest extent possible, not only to a
given measure in a specific case or dispute. It makes sense especially
when considering the indirect impact of such a law on economic
operators who may only be indirect recipients but will ultimately be
affected by the WTO agreements.67 After all, “in a treaty, the benefits
of which depend in part on the activity of individual operators[,] the
legislation itself may be construed as a breach, since the mere
existence of legislation could have an appreciable ‘chilling effect’ on
the economic activities of individuals.” 68 Moreover, since the
majority of complaints are filed not about the controversial
application of a national rule but rather about the very existence of a
domestic rule that may constitute a violation of the WTO agreements,
64 . Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (Complaint by the
European Communities), ¶ 5.25, WT/DS136/R (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Complaint by the
European Communities].
65. See Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,
Apparel and Other Items, ¶¶ 6.45-6.47, WT/DS56/R (Nov. 25, 1997); Appellate Body Report,
Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items,
¶¶ 48-55, WT/DS56/AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998); see also Panel Report, Canada – Measures
Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶¶ 9.124, 9.208, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999); Panel
Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 9.37,
WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999).
66. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.41.
67. See WANG, supra note 19, at 350.
68. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.81.

76

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:57

the amendment of the national law is taken not as a simple means of
fulfilling a particular obligation but, more significantly, as the object
of a general obligation.
The WTO obligation to comply can be described as a “Pacta
Plus” obligation as it goes beyond the classic “pacta sunt servanda”
principle of public international law. As a result, Article XVI:4 has
two consequences for the relation between domestic law and WTO
law. First, Members cannot invoke their national law in a negative
manner to escape an obligation imposed by the international trade
law. Second, they cannot do so because they are bound by the
obligation to positively adapt their national law, through
transformation or creation, whenever their law is contrary to WTO
law.69 These two consequences shed light on the ultimate objective,
that is, to remove any conflict between the two legal orders. Hence,
“Article 27 of the VCLT spells out a negative obligation by
prohibiting a State from invoking its domestic law to justify any
departure from its international obligation, while Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement establishes a positive obligation by mandating that
the State ensures the conformity of such domestic law with its WTO
obligations.”70
III. ENFORCING THE WTO OBLIGATION TO COMPLY
When the WTO agreements have become effective71 and if a
Member cannot benefit from any derogation, it must amend its

69. This requirement has consequences on the burden of proof in the WTO system. In
this system, it is sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Once the complaining party has done
so, however, it is for the defending party to submit arguments and sufficient evidence to rebut
that presumption. Should all arguments and evidence remain in equipoise, the party bearing
the original burden of proof would lose. What is requested from the defending party in terms
of evidence is, in a sense, more demanding than that for the complaining party. It makes sense
when read in relation to Article XVI:4, according to which a WTO Member can only be aware
of its obligations under WTO law. As a result, a respondent should be able to make a
demonstration that its domestic measure is not a WTO law violation. See Panel Report,
European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Complaint by Australia), ¶ 7.229,
WT/DS265/R (Oct. 15, 2004).
70. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶¶ 4.31-4.32.
71 . Since the WTO agreements entered into force on January 1, 1995, founding
Members were required to bring their law into compliance with the law of the new
organization. The WTO Members determine the terms and conditions of entry into the WTO
for the applicant nations, and may allow such countries some leeway in complying with the
WTO rules. See An Chen, The Three Big Rounds of U.S. Unilateralism Versus WTO
Multilateralism During the Last Decade: A Combined Analysis of the Great 1994 Sovereignty
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legislation to conform to the law of the WTO. To that extent, the
obligation contained in Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement is of
cardinal importance because a violation of any provision in any WTO
agreement automatically leads to a violation of Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement.72 Also, since the measure is immediately regarded
as a breach of Article XVI:4, a DSB Panel has no need to address this
issue, either, when resolving the dispute between the parties. In order
to determine the exact nature of the WTO conformity, Section A
describes why it is necessary to clarify the meaning and objective of
this principle, and to analyze the different modalities available for
Member States to adapt their internal law as required by the WTO
agreements. Consequently, WTO law imposes limitations on
important authority of its Members, viz., the authority to govern a
social body that it constitutes. Section B discusses why all WTO
Members are all bound by the obligation to adapt their legal systems
to WTO law.
A. Modalities to Comply
First, the effect of the compliance act must be to remove the
non-conformity, which can be done in two different manners. The
non-conforming measure can be brought into a state of conformity
with specified treaty provisions either by withdrawing such measure
completely,73 or, alternatively by modifying it. One can only assume

Debate, Section 301 Disputes (1998-2000), and Section 201 Disputes (2002-Present), 17
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 409, 429 (2003).
72. See Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to
Certain Agricultural Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina, ¶ 7.167,
WT/DS207/RW (Dec. 8, 2006) (“Normally, the determination of a breach of any provision of
any WTO covered agreement gives automatically rise to a violation of Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement.”). Here reference is made to the Panel in US – 1916 Act (EC) who first
found that “If Article XVI:4 has any meaning, it is that when a law, regulation or
administrative procedure of a Member has been found incompatible with the WTO obligations
of that Member under any agreement annexed to the WTO Agreement, that Member is also in
breach of its obligations under Article XVI:4.” Complaint by the European Communities,
supra note 64, ¶ 6.223.
73 . Under Article 22.1 of the DSU, both “[c]ompensation and suspension of
concessions” are available to WTO Members as a temporary measure pending compliance by
a Member found to be in breach of its WTO obligations. See DSU, supra note 3, art. 22.1.
However, recourse to compensation has rarely been used. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note
53, at 166-67. The notable exception is the US-EC Copyright dispute where, due to failure to
reach agreement on the amount of compensation, a WTO Tribunal determined the award to be
EU€1,219,900 annually. Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Section 110(5) of the US
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that a WTO Member has the capacity to withdraw or modify a
domestic rule, precisely because it makes the promise to respect the
conformity obligation.74 In case of withdrawal, a normative act will
terminate the non-conforming measure which ceases to exist. In case
of modification, the measure is amended “by excising or correcting
the offending portion of the measure involved.”75 This was iteratively
confirmed in WTO case law.76
Second, withdrawal or modification of the non-conforming
measures raises the question of the legal nature of the domestic act
which is employed. In this regard, the conformity of domestic law can
be reached through legislative or infra-legislative norms. The question
of the nature of the norm which is adopted in order to comply with
international rules is left to the Member States. The Panel states that
the 1974 American Law on foreign trade, which predicates the
adoption of unilateral sanction measures, albeit contrary in essence to
WTO regulations, is consistent insofar as there is a “licit and
effective” limitation. 77 The latter can be seen in the administrative
measures laid down by the American Congress at the time the
Marrakesh Agreement was signed. In fact, the American
administration can make a decision limiting the discretionary power
of the Representative on Trade Issues—who can enact unilateral
measures—in order to comply with WTO regulations. 78 As a
consequence, there will be as many ways to comply with WTO as
national variations of legal orders.79
Copyright Act: Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, ¶ 5.1,
WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001).
74. As argued by the US government in the China - Countervailing and Anti-dumping
Duties case, the obligations under Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement are an “evidence of
China's ability to withdraw the measures at issue.” See Award of the Arbitrator, China –
Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from
the United States, ¶ 3.13, WT/DS414/12 (May 3, 2013).
75. Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides
and the Import of Finished Leather – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, ¶ 40,
WT/DS155/10 (Aug. 31, 2001).
76. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act of 2000, ¶ 49, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
77. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.25.
78. Consequently, it is possible for Members to comply with WTO regulations through
legislative or infra-legislative measures. See Dan Sarooshi, Sovereignty, Economic Autonomy,
the United States, and the International Trading System: Representations of a Relationship, 15
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 651, 662 (2004).
79. The “[c]onformity can be ensured in different ways in different legal systems . . .
[o]nly by understanding and respecting the specificities of each Member’s legal system, can a
correct evaluation of conformity be established.” The Panel further affirms that “[f]requently
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WTO allows its Members considerable room for maneuver as far
as the formal conditions of conformity are concerned. In fact, it is not
obligatory for WTO Members to comply in a determined,
homogeneous, and formal manner following the enactment of law
incorporating these rules in their internal legal systems. 80 In this
regard, WTO conformity quite resembles the EU directives that bind
Member States to achieving their objectives only within a particular
time-limit while allowing national governments to choose the form
and means to be used. Directives have to be implemented within the
national legal framework in accordance with the procedures laid
down by individual Member States. As for the EU directives, in the
WTO compliance process “[i]t is the end result that counts, not the
manner in which it is achieved,” 81 and the WTO refrains from
imposing a standard procedure for ensuring conformity.
B. Substantive Variable
The scope of WTO law is considerable. The subject matter
and instruments addressed by the various WTO agreements cover a
great number of trade practices. The bulk of agreements, the GATT
1994 and its side agreements as well as the Schedule of Tariff
Concessions of each Member, 82 deal with trade in physical goods,
ranging from industrial products to agriculture. The GATS deals with
all kind of services, often called invisibles. The TRIPs Agreement
addresses information by defining the demarcation of appropriation,
exclusive rights, and public availability of information—or its
expression—which is of crucial importance for producing goods and
providing services in a competitive environment. The subject matter

the Legislator itself does not seek to control, through statute, all covered conduct. Instead it
delegates to pre-existing or specially created administrative agencies or other public
authorities, regulatory and supervisory tasks which are to be administered according to certain
criteria and within discretionary limits set out by the Legislator. The discretion can be wide or
narrow according to the will of the Legislator.” Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55,
¶ 7.24-7.25.
80. As stated by Wang, “Members have the freedom to choose their own ways to
implement their WTO obligations.” See WANG, supra note 19, at 351.
81. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.24.
82. A schedule is negotiated for new Members, and schedules of existing Members are
updated and modified at the end of a multilateral trade round. According to Article II:7, they
form an integral part of WTO treaty law. In the print version, these schedules comprise about
30,000 pages for all WTO Members, thus forming the bulk of the system’s legally binding
texts.
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as well as instruments may increase as needs are articulated and
accepted.83
WTO conformity obligation never changes in terms of
severity; what can change is only the explicit and precise nature of the
norms of reference, as was explained by Hans Kelsen in his General
Theory of Norms.84 Among these rules, some are of a general nature
whereas others are much more specific, which may induce variable
normative intensity into domestic legal orders. When the WTO
conformity requirement is combined to a loose provision, the Member
is left with a relatively wide margin of maneuver to comply. In this
connection, the impact into the domestic order may be relatively mild.
On the contrary, when the WTO provision is precise, narrow, and
demanding, the combination with the requirement of conformity will
be not to leave any flexibility to the Member: the WTO requirement
will have to be transposed. In this scenario, the impact of the WTO
may be more tangible in the sense that it substantially affects the
national law.
For example, the fundamental obligation of national treatment
enshrined in Article III of the GATT allows national authorities a
wide range of possibilities to conform, from the formal and material
point of view. One can however, observe that the application and the
understanding of Article III evolved quite a lot over time according to
the jurisprudence. Article III:1 of the GATT 1994 establishes a
general principle according to which internal regulations and taxes
should not be applied “so as to afford protection to domestic
production.” It informs, as a chapeau, the following paragraphs of the
provision: Paragraph 2 stipulates national treatment in relation to
internal taxes and other internal charges, whereas Paragraph 4 sets out
the general obligation to accord imported products treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of internal laws and regulations affecting the sale and use of
such products. In regulations explicitly treating domestic and
imported products differently, a violation of the national treatment
obligation is obvious since an internal law affecting the sale of
products, or a tax, on its face has a discriminatory effect. Most
83. There are no logical or inherent limits to trade regulation, and it remains a matter of
political expedience and negotiations, rather than theory and legal classifications, to define the
scope of WTO law. As much as the WTO deals with intellectual property, it may also do so in
relation to competition and investment protection.
84. See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS (1991).
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regulations, however, are designed in a neutral and de jure nondiscriminatory manner but nonetheless result in de facto
discriminatory treatment of imported products.85
The scope and practical relevance of Article III of the GATT
1994 is to a large extent dependent on the reading of the term ‘like
product.’ Its definition essentially sets the benchmark for national
regulatory freedom to treat certain imported products differently from
those domestically produced. Not astonishingly, the matter is at the
heart of the WTO system, and much attention has been paid to it in
jurisprudence and literature. Over the years, the WTO jurisprudence
developed a so-called ‘aims-and-effect’ test which was first applied in
US—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages. 86 An
assessment of the ‘aims-and-effect’ test in light of the case law allows
for two conclusions: first, the Appellate Body refused to rely on the
legislative or regulatory intent for determining likeness under the first
sentence of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, as intent is difficult to
assess in a pluralist political process where regulators pursue
diverging goals simultaneously. To rely on protectionist effects,
however, was not denied in the context of assessing the competitive
relationship of substitutable products, and the test of Article III:1 in
fine (“so as to afford protection”) fully applies. Second, the Appellate
Body’s approach in EC – Asbestos with which health risk was
examined, under Article III:4, as part of the two existing criteria of
physical product characteristics and the consumers’ tastes and habits,
implies that a distinction shall not be based on protectionist motives
and effects. In essence, the Appellate Body implicitly recognized
what the ‘aims-and-effect’ test seeks to achieve, namely to enlarge the
governments’ leeway of maneuver in the pursuit of legitimate, nonprotectionist policy goals.
Some other WTO agreements, in particular the TRIPs87 and
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, are full of very detailed provisions. In
85. The distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination is often difficult to draw
and blurred in practice. The problem is related to the scope of protection under national
treatment. Since the early days of the GATT 1947, the scope of national treatment has been
read in broad terms and thus has traditionally covered de facto discriminations extensively. See
Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, L/833 - 7S/60
(July 15, 1958) (adopted Oct. 23, 1958).
86. See Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
DS23/R - 39S/206 (Mar. 16, 1992) (adopted June 19, 1992).
87. One of the core provisions of the TRIPs Agreement is Article 50, which provides for
prompt and effective provisional measures. Most actions for infringement, or for unlawful
importation and distribution by way of parallel trade, are settled by means of such procedures

82

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:57

the ADA, in order to prevent the abuse of anti-dumping duty
proceedings, it is crucial that national anti-dumping authorities
conduct objective and unbiased investigations and determinations of
injury to a domestic industry. Therefore, the agreement sets forth
detailed provisions on the proper establishment and evaluation of the
facts and evidentiary issues. For instance, Article 18.1 of the ADA
sets that “specific action against dumping of exports from another
Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of the
GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.” Very soon, the issue
arose whether a WTO Member is permitted to distribute duties
assessed pursuant to an anti-dumping duty order—or pursuant to a
countervailing duty order—to the affected domestic producers for
qualifying expenditures. The Appellate Body confirmed the panel
report according to which such a law is a non-permissible “specific
action against dumping” contrary to Article 18:1 of the ADA.88
Consequently, as this Article will discuss later, when the DSB
was called upon to determine the conformity of Indian law with the
WTO agreements, the claim of violation of certain TRIPs provisions
in the case India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products was established; not because the
DSB was more demanding (i.e., the WTO-conformity obligation was
reinforced), but only because the reference norm was very specific.
C. Fallback in the Event of Non-Compliance
Binding DSB decisions, following fully-fledged dispute
settlement proceedings, assess legal entitlement in an authoritative
manner between two or more parties to the specific disputes. They
leave no doubt as to whether obligations were met or violated. DSB
decisions are binding upon national authorities and the losing party
must bring its legislation in line with the DSB decisions.
If the losing Member State fails to comply within the period
of time indicated by the DSB, it has to enter into negotiations with the
complaining country—or countries—in order to determine mutually
acceptable compensation: for instance, tariff reductions in areas of
and do not reach the stage of ordinary and costly proceedings on the merits. The powers
granted in Article 50 are of particular importance for trademark and copyright enforcement in
the field of software protection, as infringements can be easily deleted upon notice of
impending measures.
88. Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
¶ 1023, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
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particular interest to the complaining side. If, after twenty days, no
satisfactory compensation is agreed upon,89 the complaining side may
request the DSB for permission to impose limited trade sanctions—
“suspend concessions or obligations”—against the other side. This
gives the Member imposing authorized countermeasures the right to
temporarily desist from respecting the conformity of its national law
to the law of the WTO, vis-à-vis the defaulting Member. However,
“one of the recognized purposes of countermeasures is to induce the
defaulting party to comply with DSB recommendations.”90
Technically, the DSB authorizes the suspension of
concessions automatically under the negative consensus rule unless
the respondent objects, in which case the matter is referred to
arbitration, normally to the original panel. Actually these procedures
are really the subject of a new dispute relating to enforcement. The
DSB should grant this authorization within thirty days of the expiry of
the “reasonable period of time,” unless there is a consensus against
this action. In case of suspension of benefits,91 the WTO allows the
winning party to suspend favorable treatment, or, in simple words, to
retaliate in case the losing party does not comply with its obligation
even at the end of the “reasonable period of time.”
Materially, the magnitude of any compensation or suspension
of concessions is required to be equivalent to the level of harm—
nullification or impairment—that is caused by any illegal measure.92
The extent of retaliation depends on the level of estimated trade loss
caused by the continued application of WTO-incompatible
measures.93 In the EU – Hormones (US) case, the Arbitrators stated
89. Bryan Mercurio, Improving Dispute Settlement in the WTO: The DSU Review –
Making It Work?, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 795, 827, 832, 834 (2004).
90. Canada – Export Credit and Loan Guarantees, supra note 36, ¶ 3.47.
91. The procedure for implementing the suspension of concessions includes the drawingup and publication of a retaliatory list of products to be targeted by a plaintiff. A respondent
may object to the list if there is a dispute over the value of the harm or whether the products
covered conform to the sectoral requirements.
92. The power of the DSB and, therefore, a Dispute Panel, to authorize the suspension of
trade concessions by a plaintiff to a respondent where there is harm (nullification or
impairment), is established in Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII of GATT 1994. This paragraph
effectively binds Members of the WTO to accepting the rulings of the DSB and, also, where
appropriate, for the DSB to permit sanctions against countries found to be acting contrary to
the WTO rules.
93 . See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrator, EC Measures Affecting Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999) [hereinafter EC Measures Concerning
Meat]. In the beef hormone dispute, arbitration established that the annual value of trade
affected by these measures was CAN$11.3 million for Canada and US$116.8 million for the
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that the minimum requirements attached to a request to suspend
concessions or other obligations are: “(1) the request must set out a
specific level of suspension, i.e., a level equivalent to the nullification
and impairment caused by the WTO-inconsistent measure, pursuant
to Article 22.4; and (2) the request must specify the agreement and
sector(s) under which concessions or other obligations would be
suspended, pursuant to Article 22.3.”94
In regards to compliance, countermeasures seem to be the last
chance to force Members to respect the conformity obligation.95 In the
event of failure to comply with the initial obligations of conformity,
despite all reminders and negotiations, the defaulting Member will, as
a last resort, become the target of a countermeasure, because noncompliance is the very event justifying the adoption of
countermeasures. It is only when the illicit fact is noted that the
authority to react to it can be granted to the injured Member because
“authorization by the DSB of the suspension of concessions or other
obligations presupposes the existence of a failure to comply with the
recommendations or rulings contained in panel and/or Appellate Body
reports as adopted by the DSB.”96
IV. LITIGATING ON COMPLIANCE
The dispute settlement practice followed by the WTO since 1995
shows that the purpose of judicial organs responsible for resolving
United States. Id. ¶ 83. This represents only a small fraction of the total value of the
transatlantic beef trade. In the banana dispute, the initial claim for the suspension of
concessions by the United States was for US$520 million, but this was reduced to US$191.4
million after arbitration. See Trachtman, supra note 2, at 662. In the same dispute, the
Arbitration Panel awarded Ecuador sanctions worth US$201.6 million, substantially greater
than the annual value of its imports from the EU. In the case of the recent steel dispute, the EU
estimated that the lost value of its trade concessions as a result of US restrictions on steel
imports was some US$3 billion (EU€2.407 billion) per annum.
94. EC Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), supra note 17, ¶ 16.
95. Where disputes are between unequal trade partners, it may be counterproductive to
resort to suspension of concessions as the last resort. See generally Bryan Mercurio, Why
Compensation Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 318 (2009) [hereinafter Trade Retaliation in the WTO
DSU]. The significantly weaker injured Member may not be able to hurt the defaulting party.
The sanctions may actually harm the injured Member further, while the economic effects on
the defaulting party may be negligible. Thus, the final remedy of countermeasures may in
certain cases be ineffective in fulfilling its recognized purpose of inducing the defaulting party
to comply with DSB recommendations. Id.
96. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 4.4, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999).
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disputes is a reminder of the legality, rather than the protection of
particular interests, of the contracting governments. Its intrinsic
dynamism has led the WTO and its organs to judge matters of prime
importance in sectors that seem to bear no relation to trade, but whose
solution is essential for the natural expansion of its goals. 97 In
addition, the author agrees with Mercurio that “the DSU, as written
and interpreted, does not have clear aims and objectives (beyond
simply resolving the dispute),” 98 but believes that its aims and
objectives can be understood if the DSU is read in relation to the
WTO Agreement.
As clearly as the obligation to comply may be asserted in the
WTO legal system, violations of the rules do occur, be they based on
deliberate actions, wrong interpretations, etc. What is relevant to the
compliance process is to look at how the WTO “judges” contribute to
ensuring the respect of this central obligation to comply.99
DSM, a central feature of the WTO, has had an enormous
impact on the world trade system and trade diplomacy, and it
principally deals with questions related to the conformity of domestic
law with the WTO agreements. The DSB has to carry on the difficult
task of determining the conformity of a domestic legal order with
WTO law.100 Once the DSB makes a decision, its ruling is binding
and there is a legal obligation to comply with the ruling.101 Although
no other WTO agreements have generated as much interest as the
DSU, this Article will not go into the details of the general DSU

97. See Carla L. Reyes, WTO-Compliant Protection of Fundamental Rights: Lessons
from the EU Privacy Directive, 12 MELB. J. INT'L L. 141, 163-66 (2011) (discussing regulatory
restraints on privacy protection under the WTO).
98. Trade Retaliation in the WTO DSU, supra note 95.
99. The WTO has two major functions: legislative and judicial. The legislative function
refers to the role of the WTO as a forum in which sovereign Members seek to reach trade
agreements. The judicial function is performed by the WTO’s dispute settlement system,
which is one of the major features of this multilateral trade system. However, since the long
stalemate in multilateral negotiations has put WTO’s legislative function in low gear while the
judicial arm keeps doing its job, the implementation of WTO law has largely taken the form of
compliance with the rulings of the DSB. These rulings, in effect, have facilitated the system at
the center of trade regulation. Even so, there is no focused conceptual analysis of why the
WTO has been so efficient in enforcing its rules and compelling Members to proceed with indepth amendments to their domestic law.
100 . The DSU is “a central element in providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system.” DSU, supra note 3, art. 3(2).
101. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 109–25.
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mechanism,102 but Section A concentrates on the standard of review
adopted by the Panels and the AB in order to explain in Section B the
ramifications of the nature of national legislation on the compliance
process.
A. Standard of Review
This Article would like to highlight that when the WTO
provision underlying the control is more precise, the examination by
the DSB of the contested national measures is less likely to use the de
novo approach. Inversely, when the WTO provision is not very
precise, the DSB will have to examine the context of the national
measures more thoroughly in order to assess its conformity.
As mentioned, conformity within the framework of the WTO
system imposes on each Member the obligation to include in its legal
system the rules contained in the WTO agreements because this
process is of an obligatory nature. To that extent, the conformity
determination by the DSB consists of analyzing whether the contested
measures are consistent with WTO law or not. The role of the Panels
and the AB is to determine whether the national measures conform to
WTO law.103 “The verb ‘to determine’ means to find out, to ascertain,
to establish, or to carry out all those activities necessary to reach a
reasoned decision.”104 Such a determination can be done through a
text-to-text comparison of the domestic legislation with the relevant
WTO provisions or through a comparison of the WTO provision with
the administrative practice.
In practice, when the examination of an allegedly WTOinconsistent domestic measure or law falls within the competence of a
102. The efficiency of the GATT’s DSM was limited because it was necessary to obtain
a general consensus for adopting a report of a dispute settlement panel, and the foreseeable
refusal of a succumbing party was sufficient to prevent the adoption of the report. Under the
WTO, the GATT consensus requirement has been reversed: according to its DSU, a consensus
is required to reject a report (called “negative consensus”), rather than to adopt one. In other
words, a decision will be taken if any Member votes for it. The result of this reversal can be
seen in the quasi-automatic nature of the process. For a comprehensive overview, see SIMON
LESTER ET AL., WORLD TRADE LAW: TEXT, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 234 (2008).
103. Petros Mavroidis argues that WTO DSB organs, including panels and the AB, have
broad discretion to establish procedures necessary to fulfill their functions. See Petros C.
Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L
L. 421, 424 (2008).
104 . Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, ¶ 24, WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov.
28, 2002).
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panel, the question arises with what depth or intensity it should be
reviewed. The standard of review deemed appropriate in a specific
case defines the degree to which a panel should ‘second guess’ a
Member’s measure or law. 105 Again, the DSU does not directly
address this issue.106
The DSB, however, may face a problem when it has to deal
with determinations already made by national governments. Because
“the issue of standard of review [will arise] where a panel is
examining the domestic law of a Member as interpreted by domestic
authorities and tribunals to determine whether the law, or the actions
of those authorities and tribunals (including fact-finding), or both are
in compliance with provisions of the covered agreements.”107 Since
the WTO Agreements remain silent on the proper standard of review,
traditionally, the standard of review may be oriented in two opposite
directions according to the deference principle and the de novo
principle. 108 However, considering jurisprudence on the whole, it
shows that the panels and the AB have opted for “a middle-of-theroad approach and have applied a test which is a mixture of these two
principles depending on the particulars of the case concerned.”109
B. Mandatory vs. Discretionary Legislation
But there is still a limit in the role of the DSB regarding the
determination of WTO conformity. According to the DSB
jurisprudence, there is a clear distinction between mandatory
legislation and discretionary legislation. As underscored by Wang,
105. Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 635, 637 (2003).
106. The Anti-Dumping (“AD”) Agreement is the only agreement for which specific
standards of review of both facts and law could be agreed upon during the Uruguay Round.
GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article VI, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999),
1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
107. ROBERT HOWSE & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 194 (Routledge) (1999); see SIMON LESTER, BRYAN MERCURIO & ARWEL DAVIES.
WORLD TRADE LAW: TEXT, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 206-10 (2d ed. 2012).
108. An illustration of the de novo approach is the Thailand – Anti-dumping duties case
in which the AB held that panels are given a broad authority to investigate whether the antidumping authority of a Member properly performed fact-finding, and suggested that it could
examine not only the evidence before the anti-dumping authority but also other evidence.
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on – Angles, Shapes and Sections of
Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, ¶ 107 WT/DS122/AB/R, (Mar. 12,2001).
109. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 53, at 42.
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“government measures (including laws, regulations and
administrative actions) which leave no discretion to enforcement
authorities are capable of violating international treaties.”110
Mandatory law is law that is enforceable on its own and its
implementation does not allow the executive authority any room for
maneuver. Also, mandatory law that does not contain provisions in
conformity with WTO law automatically violates the organization’s
rules. Conversely, discretionary law allows the executive authority
room for maneuver through administrative action. It leaves the
authorities room to maneuver and enables them to remove from the
law provisions that are in conflict with WTO rules and to adopt
measures that are in conformity with international trade requirements.
Thus, these discretionary laws do not by themselves constitute a
violation of the WTO agreements and they are called into question
only if, at the time of their actual application in a particular case, they
violate the terms of the WTO Agreement, as underlined by a Panel
report: “legislation which merely gives the executive authority the
discretion, either through silence or otherwise, to act inconsistently
with the Agreement cannot as such be challenged before a Panel, i.e.,
independent of its actual application in a particular case.”111 Even so,
it is not tenable that the question of the WTO conformity of a
domestic law with a Member’s WTO obligations may not form a
subject matter of that assessment independently of its application. It is
a significant limit imposed on the general principle of the conformity
obligation.
The origin of this distinction goes back to the GATT 1947,
and the action of the GATT panels was summarized as follows in the
United States – Tobacco case: “panels had consistently ruled that
legislation which mandated action inconsistent with the General
Agreement could be challenged as such, whereas legislation which
merely gave the discretion to the executive authority [ . . . ] to act
inconsistently with the General Agreement could not be challenged as
such; only the actual application of such legislation inconsistent with
the General Agreement could be subject to challenge.”112

110. WANG, supra note 19, at 351.
111. Panel Report, United States – Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain
Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 7.129, WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002).
112. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and
Use of Tobacco, ¶ 118, B.I.S.D. 41S/131 (Oct. 4, 1994) (internal quotations omitted).
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The purpose of this distinction was to make it possible to
determine “when legislation as such—rather than a specific
application of that legislation—was inconsistent with a Contracting
Party’s GATT 1947 obligations.” 113 In any event, “the relevant
discretion, for purposes of distinguishing between mandatory and
discretionary legislation, is a discretion vested in the executive
branch of government.”114
The opening offered by the concept of discretionary
legislation, however, has recently been reduced by jurisprudence. It is
considered that the freedom allowed to national authorities to act in a
way incompatible with WTO agreements could amount to a violation
of these agreements, after all. In other words, a distinction is
maintained between mandatory and discretionary legislation,
according to which only the latter requires a WTO-inconsistent
application to violate WTO rules. This is in reference to a
development of an important case of 1999 regarding Sections 301–
310 of the Trade Act of 1974, in which the panel advanced several
arguments that are sometimes considered as indecisive, and thus it led
Yoshiko Naiki 115 to comment that “impressionist may be an
appropriate description of the panel’s way of speaking.” In that case,
a US law authorized the US authorities, without any obligation on
their part, to unilaterally sanction a pled violation of WTO law by
another Member. However, the Panel considered that the US law,
whether the freedom it allows to the Administration is exerted or not,
constitutes a violation of the WTO agreements.
Although, with some criticism one can imagine that if the
panel had admitted the compatibility of the US law, it would have left
a permanent doubt about the viability of the DSM. Also, such a doubt
would have implied significant legal risks for economic operators
who are the principal actors even though they may not be the
immediate recipients of benefits under the WTO law. If individual
economic operators cannot be confident about the integrity of WTO
dispute resolution and may fear unilateral measures outside the
guarantees and disciplines which the DSU ensures, their confidence in
each and every one of the substantive rules of the system will be
113 . Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, ¶ 88,
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000).
114. Id. ¶ 89.
115. Yoshiko Naiki, The Mandatory Discretionary Doctrine in WTO Law – The US –
Section 301 Case and Its Aftermath, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 23, 36 (2004).
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undermined as well. “The overall systemic damage and the denial of
benefits would be amplified accordingly. The assurances thus given
under the DSU may [ . . . ] be of even greater importance than those
provided under substantive WTO provisions.”116
In any case, the general principle of conformity gains
importance especially when there is concern about the indirect effects
of discretionary legislation on economic operators. This kind of limit
imposed by the distinction between mandatory legislation and
discretionary legislation is however relative. Primarily, because it
relates to the application and respect of an Article of the DSM which
determines the settlement of the disputes that the Panel regards as
fundamental, noting in addition that “the preservation of the specific
guarantees provided for in Article 23 is of added importance given the
spill-over effect they have on all material WTO rights and
obligations.”117
Insistence on discretionary legislation despite nonconformity
with WTO rules, among other things, will pose a problem, that is, to
continue to leave Members exposed to the risk of violation. Such a
situation undermines the safety and predictability of trade, and it is
difficult to reconcile it with the obligation to ensure conformity. After
all, when the law leaves room for violation, conformity is unlikely to
be guaranteed. Furthermore, the increasing number of cases raising
the issue of mandatory/discretionary legislation can demonstrate that
more and more complainants base their arguments on this theory in an
attempt to eliminate other Members’ illegal administrative
practices.118
This Article thus would like to point out an issue: if the
discretionary legislation can persist even after the implementation of
its measures has been disapproved, it may encourage the use of this
legislation as a protectionist tool. Indeed, as long as it continues, it
may become an incentive to enact some measures that are contrary to
the WTO rules. About this issue, without calling into question the
concept of discretionary legislation, the Japanese representatives,
however, proposed making an exception to the application of the
theory of discretionary legislation as the repetition of the same
infringement is highly probable: “[F]or instance, when it was evident
that a Member had deliberately ignored the recommendation of the
116. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.94.
117. See id.
118. Naiki, supra note 115, at 63.
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DSB not to apply a particular measure enacted pursuant to the law
and applied similar measures subsequently.”119 Meanwhile, they also
suggested that the burden of proof in cases involving “discretionary”
law should be shifted to the Member imposing such measures, if there
was evidence that repeated violation had taken place. In such
situations, the measures would be presumed to be inconsistent with
the WTO rules, unless proven otherwise.
V. NOVATION OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION
In the early days of the WTO, Professor Petros C. Mavroidis
conjectured that the then-newly penned DSU could theoretically
allow “hit and run”-style breach. 120 When deconstructing the
obligation of conformity, I would rather emphasize a peculiar
phenomenon which shed a great light of the WTO compliance
process, consisting of the novation of the obligation of conformity.
The absence of conformity leads the DSB to specify the
contents of the primary obligation by the creation of a derived
obligation.121 This new obligation specifies the content of the primary
obligation: such internal rules must comply with the provisions of the
WTO agreements. The DSB reports isolate the non-conformity
measures and the reasons for their non-conformity. They also locate
the exact point where the international obligation must be applied in
the internal legal system. Conceptually, a secondary obligation
contained in the decision of the DSB—which requires the law to
conform to WTO law—is grafted to treaty obligations to ensure
compliance. So there is a novation of the primary obligation to
comply. Section A will discuss the interpretation given by the DSB
reports and how it transforms the initial requirement in its form, and
Section B will discuss how it transforms the substantive content.
119. DSU Special Session, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on
13 – 15 November 2002, ¶ 3, TN/DS/M/6 (Mar. 31, 2003).
120. Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a
Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 763, 783 (2000). Professor John Jackson applied the phrase
“free pass” in 2008, pointing to the “compliance incentive problem” but leaving that problem's
resolution for another day. See John H. Jackson, The Case of the World Trade Organization,
84 INT'L. AFF. 437, 452 (2008) (applying the term “free pass” to the time lag).
121. The reasons that the adopted reports of a panel or the AB bind the parties to the
dispute are proclaimed in the DSU Agreement. According to Jackson, there are at least 11
clauses, which strongly suggest that “[T]he legal effect of an adopted panel report is the
international law obligation to perform the recommendation of the panel report.” JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 783 (2000).
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A. Transformations in the Form of the Obligation
The primary obligation to comply is the vector of the DSB
determination of compliance. When a non-conforming measure is
identified, the DSB ruling will require its compliance by either
withdrawal or modification. The DSB ruling generates a new
obligation to comply which is distinct from the primary one. First, the
secondary obligation is now emanating from the specific body of the
WTO, which makes it unilateral in nature. Second, the compliance of
the losing party is now subject to a deadline which never existed
earlier.
First, originally from a conventional source, the compliance
obligation is turned into a unilateral act when later made in a report
adopted by the DSB. The DSB, composed of all WTO Members,
exercises the powers of the General Council and performs the
functions of dispute resolution. It is only when the report has been
formally adopted by the DSB that it expresses the will of the WTO to
force compliance of domestic law. If the report is not adopted—or as
long as it has not been adopted— the findings of a panel or Appellate
Body reports have no legal status in the WTO. This reformulation of
the obligation to comply in a unilateral act does not carry an increased
strength of the obligation. However, it comes back directly to the
Member concerned as it shall respect the commitment contained in
Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.
In essence, the DSM goes beyond Article XVI:4 because a
Member is no longer free to decide how it should act but has to follow
the collective ruling against it. More precisely, if the obligation
resulting from the treaty expects the Member to ensure the conformity
of its domestic law, the obligation resulting from the DSB report
instructs the Member how to bring its measures into conformity with
the WTO law. In this respect, spontaneous execution has become a
directed execution of the treaty. Second, a deadline for the
compliance appears in the DSB ruling. DSU Article 21.1 states the
general principle that “[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or
rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution
of disputes to the benefit of all Members.”122 Accordingly, Members

122. This requirement is specified in Article 21.3 of the DSU providing that “[i]f it is
impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings, the Member
concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which to do so.” DSU, art. 21.3.
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should seek to comply “immediately” with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB.
It is only if it is “impossible” that the Member concerned is
entitled to a “reasonable time” for implementation. In determining the
reasonable period of time, the Arbitrator will have to look at the
regulatory means available in the domestic legal order. Only then
does it become possible to define the shortest period possible within
the legal system of the Member to implement the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB.123 In considering the case of whether it “is
impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and
rulings,” WTO law gives up the initial requirement of immediate
compliance. However, it is not an abandonment of the compliance
obligation itself. Instead, the WTO adopts a pragmatic position by
balancing the need for compliance and the time more or less that can
help reach compliance.
In other words, WTO law tolerates that in certain
circumstances it is not possible to immediately meet the requirement
of compliance. In this light, the secondary obligation to comply
involves a reduction of Article XVI:4 primary obligation to comply.
The introduction of a prompt compliance or the tolerance of a
“reasonable period of time” 124 have a point in common: they both
imply the emergence of a deadline. The obligation to comply thus
undergoes another transformation in terms of the time that is given to
the Member to change its law. Indeed, the secondary obligation sets
the time at which the Member will have the obligation to conform to
WTO law.

123. EC Measures Concerning Meat, supra note 93, at ¶ 16. The Arbitrators held, inter
alia, that “when implementation can be effected by administrative means, the reasonable
period of time should be considerably shorter than 15 months.” Further:
[T]he ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 21.3(c) indicates that 15
months is a ‘guideline for the arbitrator’, and not a rule. This guideline is
stated expressly to be that ‘the reasonable period of time . . . should not exceed
15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report. In
other words, the 15-month guideline is an outer limit or a maximum in the
usual case. For example, when implementation can be effected by
administrative means, the reasonable period of time should be considerably
shorter than 15 months. However, the reasonable period of time could be
shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances, as specified in
Article 21.3(c).
Id.
124. DSU, art. 21.3.
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B. Transformations of the Content of the Obligation
The obligation to comply also changes in its substantive
content since the DSB decision specifies the content of the primary
obligation and sometimes indicates the means to achieve conformity
of domestic law with the law of the WTO.
The obligation of compliance with WTO law, enshrined in the
Agreement Establishing the WTO, is general in nature. It applies to
all agreements annexed, which explicitly or implicitly state so.
However, a dispute raised before the DSB is always about an alleged
contradiction between a treaty provision and a precise and specific
internal measure. The role of the Panel or the Appellate Body consists
of determining compliance of a specific domestic rule with a specific
WTO law requirement. The report isolates the non-conforming
measure and the reasons for its non-compliance. The DSB ruling
identifies the point where the international obligation should apply in
the internal legal order. The secondary obligation to comply is a new
obligation which specifies the content of the primary obligation: such
internal rules 125 must comply with the provisions of the WTO
agreements. 126 In this sense, the secondary obligation clarifies the
primary obligation of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. In this
respect, the words show that the Member is no longer master of the
treaty. Indeed, if the obligation under the Treaty requires “the
Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that
agreement.” While the primary obligation to comply involves an
accepted and spontaneous enforcement, the secondary obligation
execution carries an enforcement supervised by the DSB.
Generally, the requirement of Article XVI:4 of the WTO
Agreement does not prescribe any particular legal technique to
perform compliance.127 However, the DSB may employ the ability to
suggest some means of enforcement of the obligation to comply
which is an authoritative opportunity there may be to exercise is left
to the discretion of the panel or the AB.128 According to Article 19:1
125 . See, e.g., Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter India Panel Report].
126. In this case, TRIPs art. 70.8(a).
127 . Consequently, Members have a real autonomy to conduct compliance of their
normative spaces. This principle is not questioned when the DSB adopts the decision to
require a Member to change an internal measure to comply with its obligations.
128. Some authors are favorable and encouraging. Y. Fukunaga, Securing Compliance
Through the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of DSB Recommendations, 9 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 383, 400 (2006) (“As long as the complaining party specifies a certain way in
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of the DSU,129 when a panel or the AB concludes that “a measure is
inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the
Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that
agreement.” Meanwhile, the panel or AB “may suggest ways in which
the Member concerned could implement the recommendations”130 and
could bring the measure into accordance with that agreement. This
provision has been interpreted by the panel according to which:
Article 19.1 appears to envisage suggestions regarding what
could be done to a measure to bring it into conformity or, in case
of a recommendation under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement,
what could be done to ‘withdraw’ the prohibited subsidy. It is not
clear if Article 19.1 also addresses issues of surveillance of those
steps. That said, any agreement that WTO Members might reach
among themselves to improve transparency regarding the
implementation of WTO obligations can only be encouraged.131

There are some instances of DSB Reports making such substantive
recommendations. Thus, the Panel in Quantitative Restrictions on
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products suggested to
India and the United States that they should negotiate a phase-out
period for the offending restrictions. 132 In another case, the United
States requested that the Panel suggest to India that it should
implement its obligation in the same way as Pakistan had
implemented its obligation under TRIPs by establishing a mechanism
to protect patent applications during a transitional period. The Panel
formally declined this demand, saying that it would impair India’s
right to choose how to implement, but discreetly added that “India
should take into account the interests of those persons who would
have filed patent applications had an appropriate mechanism been
maintained.” 133 In a sense, Article 19.1 of the DSU reinforces the
requirement of conformity as indicated by how materially the losing
which the DSB recommendations can be implemented, it would be preferable to encourage a
panel to assess the specified way and, if appropriate, to suggest the specified way as a valid
implementation option, with an explicit statement that there may exist other effective ways to
implement the DSB recommendations.”).
129. DSU, art. 19.1 (“In addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body
may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations.”).
130. See id.
131. Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 7.3,
WT/DS46/RW (May 9, 2000).
132. Panel Report, Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products, ¶ 7.7, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999).
133. See India Panel Report, supra note 125, ¶ 8.2.
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party can comply, i.e., modify and correct the domestic measure. Of
course, such a material suggestion is not binding on the Member,
however, when the Member concerned follows a suggestion of a
Panel or the AB, its action would be seen as being de facto in
compliance with any provision of Article 21:5 of the DSU reviewed
by that tribunal which is an incentive for the losing party to take the
suggestion.134
CONCLUSION
In light of the WTO’s massive impact on domestic legal
systems and its great influence, the topic of conformity of domestic
law with WTO law has become a systemic issue that goes to the core
and raisons d’être of the multilateral trading system. Also, this
impressive compliance over the years must reinforce the Members’
will to obtain the best results possible during the present negotiations.
Any new agreement will benefit from the WTO-conformity principle.
In this respect, each new engagement should be considered in light of
the changes it implies for domestic law. These changes have
consequences for the economic sector and also have social
repercussions, which should be the countries’ main preoccupation.
The WTO compliance obligation is not absolute as it has a
few limits.135 In addition, the DSB is in fact a restatement of the initial
obligation of compliance without imposing a sanction which would
cover the period during which an internal rule existed in opposition to
WTO law. In reality, the multilateral trading system does not seek
absolute compliance with WTO law, or even to repair the lack of
conformity. The WTO system only wants the law to not permanently
impede the implementation of the treaty commitments.
The obligation to conform on the basis of a DSB report does
not invalidate the conformity obligation in the agreement. However,
even though the primary rule remains valid, only the compliance ex
nunc as of the expiry of the reasonable period of time for compliance
with the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB is
required. The non-fulfillment of the initial obligation is invalidated by
the execution of the treaty and there is no attempt to examine the

134. See DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 299 (2004).
135. Especially in terms of tolerance reserved for dispositive law.
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reasons for its non-fulfillment. In other words, only the suspension of
the illicit act is essential.136
In the WTO compliance process, the defaulting Member is
thus only asked to fulfill his initial obligation without being held
responsible for remedying the consequences of his illegal action. In
essence, the Member is only expected to do what he was initially
supposed to but not at the time when it should have been done in the
first place, which is however a basic principle of both domestic law
and international law.137 In a strict sense, the Member does not have
to answer for the breach of the obligation, but rather is only expected
to put an end to it. Neither compensation nor the suspension of
concessions can be applied retrospectively, and, in essence WTO
views remedies as being only prospective and not retrospective. 138
This means that there is no recompense for any harm caused by an
illegal trade measure prior to and during the implementation of
dispute procedures. Also, it means that the action of the defaulting
State cannot be punished.139 The DSB does not take into account the
damage already caused and gives more importance to the future
execution of the treaty.
Conceptually, non-observance of the primary obligation does
not entail a secondary obligation to remedy the failure to act, but
136. As the Arbitrators have said, “language used throughout the DSU demonstrates that
when a Member’s measure has been found to be inconsistent with a WTO Agreement, the
Member’s obligation extends only to providing prospective relief, and not to remedying past
transgressions.” Panel Report, United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, ¶ 3.87, WT/DS221/R (July 15, 2002) [hereinafter Panel Report United States
– Section 129(c)(1)].
137. As stated in 1928 by the Permanent International Court of Justice in the Chorzow
Factory case, because “[T]he essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act
(a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the
decisions of arbitral tribunals) is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if that act had not been committed.” Factory at Chorzow (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 125 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Chorzow Factory].
138. As Petros Mavroidis states, “WTO practice suggests that, contrary to what is the
case in customary international law, damages will be calculated from the end of the
implementation period and not from the earlier moment when the illegality occurred.”
Mavroidis, supra note 103, at 438. Public international law approach to remedies was set out
in the 1928 Chorzow Factory decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice. See
Chorzow Factory, supra note 137.
139. In this regard, the Arbitrators have said that “a countermeasure becomes punitive
when it is not only intended to ensure that the State in breach of its obligations brings its
conduct into conformity with its international obligations, but contains an additional dimension
meant to sanction the action of that State.” See Panel Report United States – Section 129(c)(1),
supra note 136.
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rather a secondary obligation in the form of a reminder to comply
with the primary obligation. Even more fascinating, the primary
obligation of similarity is replaced by a secondary obligation of
proximity, and the DSB decision is controlled by fixing a threshold of
compatibility.
Compliance with WTO law cannot be explained by the existence
of a mere obligation to comply. Actually, this obligation to comply
generates complex transnational legal processes which even modify
the initial obligation. The distinctive feature of the WTO settlement
system does not lay in a vertical obligation which would force
Members to comply. This is just an illusion because such a rigid
framework does not actually exist in the law of the Organization.
However, once deconstructed, the obligation of conformity reveals a
complex mutation which generates a process. In that process,
Members are enmeshed in procedural requirements and successive
exchanges which gradually show them how they can align their laws
and policies with international rules. Until the adoption of
countermeasures, everything in the WTO Dispute Settlement process
smoothly converges in just one direction, in other words, ensuring the
execution of the WTO Agreement and consequently, the compliance
of the national law.
So when one reads that compliance with DSB is high, it is a
forced perspective. Indeed, if there is a ruling of noncompliance, it
means that one Member did not respect the initial obligation. Instead
of looking at the past, the WTO, very pragmatically, reformulates a
secondary obligation which this time must be enforced. One may
criticize WTO as not implementing a full-fledged law of
responsibility, but results over past decades speak stunningly to the
contrary.

